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People Of Michigan v. Eads
July 30, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Kimberly Thomas
A 16-year-old defendant shot and killed a 17-year-old in what appeared to be a gang-related incident. The defendant, riding in the backseat of a car, observed the victim wearing a rival gang’s T-shirt, exited the vehicle, and shot the victim five times. Charged with first-degree murder and felony-firearm, the jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him as an adult to 50 to 75 years’…A 16-year-old defendant shot and killed a 17-year-old in what appeared to be a gang-related incident. The defendant, riding in the backseat of a car, observed the victim wearing a rival gang’s T-shirt, exited the vehicle, and shot the victim five times. Charged with first-degree murder and felony-firearm, the jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him as an adult to 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder, consecutive to two years for felony-firearm, exceeding the advisory sentencing guidelines recommending 12 to 25 years or parolable life.
On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding no disproportionality under People v Milbourn. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Decades later, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing his sentence was unconstitutional and disproportionate in light of Miller v Alabama and related cases. The Wayne Circuit Court denied the motion, as did the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of People v Stovall and People v Boykin, which addressed youth sentencing.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder committed by a youthful offender violates the prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment under the state constitution and applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court found that all Bullock factors supported this conclusion, noting that such a sentence is harsher than those imposed for first-degree murder on youths and fails to advance rehabilitation. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s denial of relief, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing, while vacating portions of the Court of Appeals’ opinion addressing Milbourn and Boykin.
Categories: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
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People Of Michigan v. Jade
July 31, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Noah Hood
A man responded to an online advertisement posted by undercover law enforcement officers as part of a sting operation targeting child sex trafficking. The ad depicted an adult woman and described sexual activities. During a text exchange, the decoy stated that she was 15 years old. The defendant replied that the person needed to be at least 16, but after further discussion and a phone call (which was not recorded), the conversation resumed and the…A man responded to an online advertisement posted by undercover law enforcement officers as part of a sting operation targeting child sex trafficking. The ad depicted an adult woman and described sexual activities. During a text exchange, the decoy stated that she was 15 years old. The defendant replied that the person needed to be at least 16, but after further discussion and a phone call (which was not recorded), the conversation resumed and the decoy again referenced sex for money. The defendant ultimately went to a hotel room where he was arrested and charged with several offenses, including accosting a child for immoral purposes and child sexually abusive activity.
In the Van Buren Circuit Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges based on entrapment. The court held an evidentiary hearing and applied Michigan’s two-prong entrapment test, ultimately finding the defendant had not established entrapment under either prong and denied the motion. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. While that appeal was pending, he pleaded guilty to accosting a child for immoral purposes in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case to clarify the standards for reviewing entrapment determinations and the legal framework for entrapment claims. The Court held that a trial court’s factual findings following an entrapment hearing are reviewed for clear error, but its ultimate legal determination regarding entrapment is reviewed de novo. The Court also clarified Michigan’s two-prong modified objective entrapment test, including the roles of unlawful inducement, reprehensible conduct, and escalation. The Court found that the lower courts did not properly consider whether law enforcement escalated the defendant’s conduct from a lesser crime to a more serious offense and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals’ opinion was vacated.
Category: Criminal Law
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In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5
July 31, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Elizabeth Welch
Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups…Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it.
The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Categories: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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Attorney General v. Eli Lilly And Company
July 31, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Noah Hood
The Michigan Attorney General initiated an investigation into Eli Lilly and Company's insulin pricing practices, alleging potential violations of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). Specifically, the Attorney General asserted there was probable cause to believe Eli Lilly's pricing strategies for insulin, including disparities between branded and generic products and differences between U.S. and international prices, constituted violations of specific MCPA provisions. The Attorney General sought authorization from the Ingham Circuit Court to issue investigative…The Michigan Attorney General initiated an investigation into Eli Lilly and Company's insulin pricing practices, alleging potential violations of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). Specifically, the Attorney General asserted there was probable cause to believe Eli Lilly's pricing strategies for insulin, including disparities between branded and generic products and differences between U.S. and international prices, constituted violations of specific MCPA provisions. The Attorney General sought authorization from the Ingham Circuit Court to issue investigative subpoenas and also filed a complaint for declaratory relief, asking the court to rule that the investigation and any future enforcement action were not barred by a statutory exemption for conduct "specifically authorized" by law.
The Ingham Circuit Court found probable cause for the investigation and authorized subpoenas. However, Eli Lilly argued that, based on prior Michigan Supreme Court decisions—Smith v Globe Life Ins Co and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc.—the MCPA exemption for regulated conduct applied, as the sale of pharmaceuticals is regulated by law. The parties agreed to pause the subpoenas pending resolution of the declaratory relief action. The circuit court granted summary disposition for Eli Lilly, concluding the exemption applied, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.
On review, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled its previous broad interpretation of the MCPA exemption in Smith and Liss, holding instead that courts must consider whether the specific transaction or conduct at issue, rather than the general activity, is "specifically authorized" by law. The Court found that Smith and Liss had improperly expanded the exemption, undermining the MCPA's purpose. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated the circuit court's order, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Eli Lilly's specific conduct was exempt under the new, narrower standard.
Category: Consumer Law
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People Of Michigan v. Madison
July 31, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Richard Bernstein
A 19-year-old defendant was charged with open murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and two counts of felony-firearm after allegedly shooting two companions while riding through a park, resulting in one fatality and serious injuries to the other individual. The defendant requested evaluations for competency and criminal responsibility. Medical experts concluded that, although the defendant suffered from a significant mental illness—diagnosed as schizophreniform disorder—he was competent to stand trial and was not legally insane…A 19-year-old defendant was charged with open murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and two counts of felony-firearm after allegedly shooting two companions while riding through a park, resulting in one fatality and serious injuries to the other individual. The defendant requested evaluations for competency and criminal responsibility. Medical experts concluded that, although the defendant suffered from a significant mental illness—diagnosed as schizophreniform disorder—he was competent to stand trial and was not legally insane at the time of the offense. Defense experts agreed he was not legally insane but argued that his mental illness affected his ability to form specific intent.
The defendant sought to introduce evidence and jury instructions on diminished capacity, contending that his mental illness negated the specific intent required for the charged offenses. The Ottawa Circuit Court denied this request, relying on the Michigan Supreme Court’s prior decision in People v Carpenter, which held that evidence of mental incapacity short of insanity could not be used to negate specific intent. The defendant’s application for leave to appeal was denied by the Michigan Court of Appeals. He then sought interlocutory review in the Michigan Supreme Court, arguing that Carpenter was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that its decision in Carpenter was erroneous and overruled it. The Court concluded that Michigan’s legal-insanity statute does not bar defendants from presenting evidence of diminished capacity to challenge the mens rea of specific-intent crimes. The Court emphasized that diminished capacity and the insanity defense are distinct; the former may negate an element of a crime, while the latter is an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Category: Criminal Law
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People v. Serges
July 30, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Richard Bernstein
An elderly woman was found dead in her home after suffering multiple blunt force traumas to her head. The crime scene showed extensive blood, but no evidence directly linked any suspect. Several witnesses reported seeing the defendant in the neighborhood around the time of the murder; he had previously performed housework and yardwork for the victim. When questioned, the defendant denied involvement. He was arrested on November 29, 2017, though there was ambiguity regarding whether…An elderly woman was found dead in her home after suffering multiple blunt force traumas to her head. The crime scene showed extensive blood, but no evidence directly linked any suspect. Several witnesses reported seeing the defendant in the neighborhood around the time of the murder; he had previously performed housework and yardwork for the victim. When questioned, the defendant denied involvement. He was arrested on November 29, 2017, though there was ambiguity regarding whether the arrest was for an unrelated 2016 misdemeanor or suspicion of homicide. The day after his arrest, the detective collected the defendant’s pants and other belongings from jail custody without seeking a warrant or consent. Over a month later, police submitted the pants for DNA testing, which revealed a small bloodstain matching the victim’s DNA.
At the defendant’s first jury trial in the Genesee Circuit Court, the jury could not reach a verdict. At the retrial, the defense argued the tiny bloodstain did not connect the defendant to the violent crime scene and did not move to suppress the DNA evidence. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole. The defendant moved for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, arguing the DNA evidence should have been excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and that his counsel was ineffective for not seeking its suppression. The trial court denied the motion. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no constitutional violation and concluding counsel’s performance was reasonable.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It held that DNA testing of the defendant’s pants, performed without a warrant or consent, constituted an unreasonable search under Article 1, Section 11 of the Michigan Constitution. The court found that neither the inventory-search nor search-incident-to-arrest exceptions applied, especially since the arrest was for an unrelated charge. The court further held that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of this evidence, and that the error prejudiced the defendant, as the DNA evidence was the only physical evidence linking him to the crime. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Category: Criminal Law
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People v. Sanders
July 30, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Kyra Harris Bolden
A man was arrested without a warrant after taking his three-month-old daughter to the hospital, where doctors suspected abuse. He denied harming the child during initial police questioning. The child died that evening, and an autopsy the next day concluded her death was a homicide due to traumatic brain injury. Two days after his arrest, and at least 64 hours into his warrantless detention, the man waived his Miranda rights and made statements to a…A man was arrested without a warrant after taking his three-month-old daughter to the hospital, where doctors suspected abuse. He denied harming the child during initial police questioning. The child died that evening, and an autopsy the next day concluded her death was a homicide due to traumatic brain injury. Two days after his arrest, and at least 64 hours into his warrantless detention, the man waived his Miranda rights and made statements to a detective that included several explanations for his daughter’s injuries, including that he shook her. A magistrate later found probable cause and authorized a criminal complaint.
The man was convicted by a jury in the Ingham Circuit Court of felony murder and first-degree child abuse. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Years later, the trial court granted the man’s motion for relief from judgment due to ineffective assistance of counsel, leading to a new trial. Before the retrial, the prosecution sought to admit his statements from the prolonged detention. The trial court, following a hearing, ruled the statements were voluntary under the factors from People v Cipriano and thus admissible, despite acknowledging that the man had been detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment under Riverside Co v McLaughlin. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal this ruling.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that when an arrestee is detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for a prompt judicial determination of probable cause, any statements made must be excluded unless the prosecution proves the statements were sufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional detention. Voluntariness under Cipriano is a separate inquiry. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order admitting the statements and remanded for determination under the proper standard.
Categories: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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People v. Haupt
July 30, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Kyra Harris Bolden
A 19-year-old defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including producing, distributing, and possessing child sexually abusive material, after police found images and incriminating communications on his cell phone during investigations related to a prior stalking complaint involving a 17-year-old. The defendant initially retained counsel, but due to communication breakdowns, both his retained and later court-appointed attorneys were permitted to withdraw. As a result, the defendant was left either entirely without counsel or with only advisory…A 19-year-old defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including producing, distributing, and possessing child sexually abusive material, after police found images and incriminating communications on his cell phone during investigations related to a prior stalking complaint involving a 17-year-old. The defendant initially retained counsel, but due to communication breakdowns, both his retained and later court-appointed attorneys were permitted to withdraw. As a result, the defendant was left either entirely without counsel or with only advisory counsel during key pretrial proceedings, including a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence obtained from his phone and a motion to dismiss. The trial court did not ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, nor did it adequately advise him of the consequences of self-representation.
After a jury trial at which the defendant was ultimately represented again by counsel, he was convicted on all charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that although the trial court failed to comply with required procedures for waiver of counsel, the defendant was not entitled to relief because he had not been deprived of counsel at a critical stage, and any error did not warrant automatic reversal. The court also suggested the defendant might have forfeited his right to counsel through his conduct.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the defendant was deprived of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, specifically at the suppression hearing addressing evidence central to the prosecution. The Court found no valid waiver of counsel, nor that the defendant had forfeited his right through misconduct. The Court determined that the deprivation constituted structural error, requiring automatic reversal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, the convictions and sentences were vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Category: Criminal Law
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People v. Black
July 30, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Noah Hood
A defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted in 1988 of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm following a bench trial. He received a sentence of life without parole for the murder conviction. After the United States Supreme Court decided in *Miller v. Alabama* that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional, and in *Montgomery v. Louisiana* that this rule applies retroactively, the prosecution moved…A defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted in 1988 of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm following a bench trial. He received a sentence of life without parole for the murder conviction. After the United States Supreme Court decided in *Miller v. Alabama* that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional, and in *Montgomery v. Louisiana* that this rule applies retroactively, the prosecution moved to reimpose the defendant’s life without parole sentence under Michigan law. At his resentencing hearing, the defendant presented expert psychological evidence suggesting his capacity for rehabilitation, while the prosecution presented no witnesses. The trial court reimposed the life without parole sentence, stating the prosecution did not bear the burden of proof.
The Michigan Court of Appeals later vacated the amended sentence after the Michigan Supreme Court held in *People v. Taylor* that the prosecution bears the burden of proof at such hearings. On remand, the prosecution requested that the defendant be compelled to undergo a psychological evaluation by its expert or, alternatively, that the defense’s psychological evidence be excluded. The trial court granted this request, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that if a defendant intends to introduce expert psychological evidence at a Miller resentencing hearing, the trial court may require the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by a prosecution expert, consistent with the constitutional right against self-incrimination. However, evidence from this compelled examination is admissible only as rebuttal and not during the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court also clarified that the second Miller hearing is a new proceeding and vacated any order incorporating the record from the prior hearing. The case was remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with these rulings.
Categories: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
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People of Michigan v. Armogeda
July 29, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Megan Cavanagh
The defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, and third-degree fleeing and eluding. At sentencing, the trial court calculated his guidelines minimum sentence range as 270 to 450 months for the assault conviction and imposed a sentence of 360 to 600 months. The defendant moved to correct his sentence, arguing that Prior Record Variable 2 and Offense Variable 12 were scored incorrectly,…The defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, and third-degree fleeing and eluding. At sentencing, the trial court calculated his guidelines minimum sentence range as 270 to 450 months for the assault conviction and imposed a sentence of 360 to 600 months. The defendant moved to correct his sentence, arguing that Prior Record Variable 2 and Offense Variable 12 were scored incorrectly, which would lower his guidelines range. The prosecution agreed with some of the scoring errors, but the trial court declined to resolve the precise range, stating it would impose the same sentence regardless of the corrected guidelines.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s sentence, holding that resentencing was unnecessary because the trial court had clearly indicated it would have imposed the same sentence even with the corrected guideline scores. However, the Court of Appeals remanded for the presentence investigation report to be amended to reflect the correct guideline scoring and range. On remand, the parties stipulated to a corrected range of 171 to 285 months, and the trial court amended the report but did not resentence the defendant.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed whether resentencing is required when a sentence is based on inaccurate guidelines scoring and falls outside the corrected range, even if the trial court would have imposed the same sentence. The Court held that a defendant is entitled to resentencing in such circumstances, reaffirming that reliance on an incorrect guidelines range requires resentencing, regardless of the trial court’s stated intentions. The Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed in part, and the case was remanded for resentencing, requiring the trial court to rescore the guidelines and consider the correct range, while allowing the same sentence if found to be reasonable and proportionate.
Category: Criminal Law
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Estate Of Ernest v. Brown
July 29, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Richard Bernstein
A patient died from a bilateral pulmonary embolism after being seen at a hospital for chest pain, and his estate, through its personal representative, brought a medical malpractice action against several doctors and the hospital. The alleged malpractice occurred on July 16, 2020. The personal representative received authority to act for the estate on June 7, 2021, sent a notice of intent to sue to defendants on February 10, 2023, and filed the complaint on…A patient died from a bilateral pulmonary embolism after being seen at a hospital for chest pain, and his estate, through its personal representative, brought a medical malpractice action against several doctors and the hospital. The alleged malpractice occurred on July 16, 2020. The personal representative received authority to act for the estate on June 7, 2021, sent a notice of intent to sue to defendants on February 10, 2023, and filed the complaint on August 14, 2023.
The Genesee Circuit Court, applying Michigan Supreme Court precedent from Waltz v Wyse, granted summary disposition for defendants, holding the suit time-barred because the statutory extension for personal representatives in wrongful death actions (under MCL 600.5852) was not subject to tolling during the notice-of-intent period. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, stating it was bound by Waltz. The Michigan Supreme Court initially denied a bypass application but later ordered oral argument on whether Waltz was correctly decided and whether it should be retained under stare decisis.
The Michigan Supreme Court overruled Waltz, holding that MCL 600.5852 does incorporate a limitations period and is subject to tolling under MCL 600.5856, which includes tolling for the 182-day notice-of-intent period required in medical malpractice actions. The Court concluded that the Legislature intended for personal representatives to benefit from this tolling and that there was no statutory or policy basis to exclude wrongful death actions from such tolling. The Court also determined that stare decisis did not justify retaining Waltz. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Categories: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury
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People Of Michigan v. Langston
July 28, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Kyra Harris Bolden
In 1976, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder for aiding and abetting an armed robbery in which another individual committed a fatal shooting at a grocery store. The defendant was not present during the actual shooting but had provided information about the store’s occupants to the principal. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court’s instructions to the jury did not require a finding…In 1976, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder for aiding and abetting an armed robbery in which another individual committed a fatal shooting at a grocery store. The defendant was not present during the actual shooting but had provided information about the store’s occupants to the principal. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court’s instructions to the jury did not require a finding of malice as later defined by Michigan law.
On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to improper jury instructions regarding the mens rea for felony murder. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after its decision in People v Aaron, which redefined malice for felony murder but applied only to trials in progress or later. The case returned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied further review.
In 2020, the defendant filed for post-judgment relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional because the jury did not make a finding of malice as required by Aaron, and that mandatory life without parole was cruel or unusual punishment. The trial court denied his motion, stating it was bound by precedent, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for pre-Aaron felony murder constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution if the jury was not instructed on malice as defined by Aaron, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found malice based on the trial evidence. If the prosecution fails to meet this burden, the no-parole aspect of the sentence must be struck, making the defendant eligible for parole. The trial court’s order was vacated in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Categories: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Canty v. Mason
July 27, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Richard Bernstein
The plaintiff was injured in a car accident allegedly caused by the defendant. At the time, the plaintiff had no-fault insurance but had opted out of personal protection insurance (PIP) coverage because he was covered by Medicare Parts A and B, which is permitted under Michigan law. Instead of seeking PIP benefits for medical expenses, the plaintiff filed a tort suit against the defendant to recover his medical costs. Although several of the plaintiff’s medical…The plaintiff was injured in a car accident allegedly caused by the defendant. At the time, the plaintiff had no-fault insurance but had opted out of personal protection insurance (PIP) coverage because he was covered by Medicare Parts A and B, which is permitted under Michigan law. Instead of seeking PIP benefits for medical expenses, the plaintiff filed a tort suit against the defendant to recover his medical costs. Although several of the plaintiff’s medical providers accepted Medicare, none billed Medicare or charged Medicare rates, and the plaintiff did not submit claims to Medicare, instead seeking the full billed amounts as damages.
In the Wayne Circuit Court, the defendant moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff should have mitigated his damages by using Medicare and that his recovery should be subject to statutory reimbursement limits based on Medicare fee schedules. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff did not have a duty to mitigate by seeking Medicare payments and that the reimbursement limitations did not apply to third-party tort claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the plaintiff did have a duty to mitigate damages by seeking Medicare payments and that reimbursement limitations applied to his claim.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the common-law duty to mitigate damages applies to a tort claim brought under MCL 500.3135(3)(c), so plaintiffs with Medicare coverage must seek payment from Medicare for treatment received from Medicare-participating providers. However, the Court also held that the reimbursement limitations in MCL 500.3157, which cap payments at Medicare rates, do not apply to tort claims under that statutory section. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Category: Personal Injury
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People Of Michigan v. Jennings
July 24, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Megan Cavanagh
A man was stopped by police while driving a car matching the description of a vehicle seen leaving the scene of a shooting. Police found a loaded handgun in the glovebox. During questioning, the driver admitted to being at the scene and driving the car, but when asked for a DNA sample to compare with the handgun, he refused and ended the interview. At trial, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s decision to stop cooperating…A man was stopped by police while driving a car matching the description of a vehicle seen leaving the scene of a shooting. Police found a loaded handgun in the glovebox. During questioning, the driver admitted to being at the scene and driving the car, but when asked for a DNA sample to compare with the handgun, he refused and ended the interview. At trial, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s decision to stop cooperating was evidence of a “guilty conscience,” displaying a board with that phrase to the jury and contrasting his actions with those of other occupants who continued their interviews.
After closing arguments, the Macomb Circuit Court judge raised concerns that the prosecutor’s comments improperly used the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence against him. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court granted. The defendant argued that a retrial would violate double jeopardy, but the trial court denied this, finding no evidence that the prosecutor specifically intended to provoke a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution shifted its theory, and the defendant was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that retrial was not barred under the standard from Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667 (1982), because the prosecutor’s misconduct was not intended to goad the defense into requesting a mistrial but was instead reckless or negligent.
On further appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Kennedy standard does not properly protect the double-jeopardy rights guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution. The Court rejected Kennedy and adopted the broader standard from Pool v Superior Court, 139 Ariz 98 (1984), holding that retrial is barred if a mistrial is granted due to intentional, prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct pursued for an improper purpose with indifference to the risk of mistrial, and the resulting prejudice cannot be cured short of a mistrial. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for application of the new standard.
Categories: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Frownfelter v. Esurance Property And Casualty Insurance Co.
July 22, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Brian Zahra
A minor was injured in a car accident while traveling from her father's home to school. Her parents had divorced and, according to a 2011 custody order, shared joint physical custody with an equal division of parenting time. However, in practice, the minor spent about 75% of her time at her mother’s home and 25% at her father’s. At the time of the accident, she was staying at her father's house. Multiple insurance companies insured…A minor was injured in a car accident while traveling from her father's home to school. Her parents had divorced and, according to a 2011 custody order, shared joint physical custody with an equal division of parenting time. However, in practice, the minor spent about 75% of her time at her mother’s home and 25% at her father’s. At the time of the accident, she was staying at her father's house. Multiple insurance companies insured her parents, and disputes arose regarding which insurer was responsible for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits and the applicable liability coverage under her father’s insurance policy.
The Oakland Circuit Court denied Esurance’s motion for summary disposition, which argued that the minor was domiciled with her mother and that Auto-Owners, her mother’s insurer, should be the highest priority insurer. The court instead granted Auto-Owners’ request for judgment, finding the minor was domiciled with her father based on the custody order and the Michigan Supreme Court’s prior decision in Grange Insurance Company of Michigan v Lawrence, which treated custody orders as determinative of domicile. The trial court also ruled that she was a resident of her father’s home for purposes of a step-down provision in his Esurance policy, limiting liability coverage. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the minor was domiciled and resident at her father's home at the time of the accident.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and overruled the Grange domicile rule. The Court held that a custody order does not conclusively determine a child’s domicile for purposes of the no-fault act. Instead, the custody order serves as a starting point, but courts must review all facts and circumstances—including traditional domicile factors—to determine domicile. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment regarding domicile and residency and remanded the case to the trial court.
Category: Insurance Law
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Exclusive Capital Partners LLC v. City Of Royal Oak
July 23, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court
A city adopted an ordinance regulating recreational marijuana establishments, limiting the number of retail licenses available and establishing a competitive process for selecting license recipients. The city manager was granted the authority to implement and administer the application process, including ranking applicants according to specific criteria. Twenty-one applications were submitted for two licenses; the city manager convened a workgroup of city officials to assist in reviewing applications and ultimately selected two applicants other than the…A city adopted an ordinance regulating recreational marijuana establishments, limiting the number of retail licenses available and establishing a competitive process for selecting license recipients. The city manager was granted the authority to implement and administer the application process, including ranking applicants according to specific criteria. Twenty-one applications were submitted for two licenses; the city manager convened a workgroup of city officials to assist in reviewing applications and ultimately selected two applicants other than the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were placed on a waitlist in case the selected applicants failed subsequent requirements.
Plaintiffs Quality Roots, Inc., and Exclusive Capital Partners LLC filed complaints in the Oakland Circuit Court, challenging the city’s license issuance and alleging violations of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA) and the Open Meetings Act (OMA). The city moved for summary disposition, which the trial court granted, rejecting claims of OMA violations and other alleged statutory breaches. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition regarding the MRTMA claims but reversed as to the OMA claims, finding the city manager a “governing body” under the OMA and remanding for a remedy regarding the OMA violation. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the city commission had delegated its authority to the city manager, making him subject to OMA requirements.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the city manager was not required to comply with the OMA during the marijuana retail license selection process. The court found that the city manager acted under independent ordinance-based authority, not as a public body or by delegated authority from the city commission, and thus was not subject to OMA requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the relevant part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the city.
Category: Government & Administrative Law
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People of Michigan v. Wilkins
July 22, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Kimberly Thomas
A Michigan State Police trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding, driven by the defendant, with a passenger under the age of 21. The trooper smelled marijuana but did not see any in plain view, nor did the occupants appear intoxicated or in possession. After both initially denied possessing marijuana, the passenger admitted to having a small amount (“shake”), which under Michigan law is a civil infraction for those under 21. The trooper then searched the…A Michigan State Police trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding, driven by the defendant, with a passenger under the age of 21. The trooper smelled marijuana but did not see any in plain view, nor did the occupants appear intoxicated or in possession. After both initially denied possessing marijuana, the passenger admitted to having a small amount (“shake”), which under Michigan law is a civil infraction for those under 21. The trooper then searched the vehicle and found a concealed firearm, which the defendant admitted was his.
At the preliminary examination, the defendant argued that the vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The 63rd District Court bound him over on the concealed weapon charge. In Kent Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the firearm, but the motion was denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals, after remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, affirmed the circuit court’s denial, holding the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court of Michigan reviewed the case and held that the warrantless search was unlawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The Court found that the trooper had probable cause only to believe a civil infraction (possession of a small amount of marijuana by a minor) had occurred, not a crime. The Court clarified that probable cause to believe only a civil infraction has been committed does not justify a warrantless search under the automobile exception. The presence of marijuana odor, without more, does not establish probable cause to believe a criminal amount is present. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Category: Constitutional Law
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People of Michigan v. Ellis
July 22, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Megan Cavanagh
The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unarmed robbery in Michigan in 2021, following a prior conviction for attempted rape in Illinois in 1983. As part of the 2022 sentence, the Berrien Circuit Court imposed lifetime registration as a Tier III sex offender under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), based on the statute’s “recapture” provision. This provision requires individuals with pre-SORA sexual offense convictions to register if they are later convicted of any felony after…The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unarmed robbery in Michigan in 2021, following a prior conviction for attempted rape in Illinois in 1983. As part of the 2022 sentence, the Berrien Circuit Court imposed lifetime registration as a Tier III sex offender under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), based on the statute’s “recapture” provision. This provision requires individuals with pre-SORA sexual offense convictions to register if they are later convicted of any felony after July 1, 2011. The defendant had not committed another sexual offense in the intervening decades, and his recent conviction involved theft and a disputed assault in a Walmart store.
After sentencing, the defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing it was unconstitutional and not applicable because he was an out-of-state resident. The Berrien Circuit Court denied his motion to correct an invalid sentence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the registration requirement constitutional but held that the defendant, as a nonresident, did not have to register unless he moved to or worked in Michigan.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether SORA’s recapture provision constituted cruel or unusual punishment when imposed for nonsexual offenses. The Court held that imposing SORA registration on individuals convicted of nonsexual offenses who had a pre-SORA sexual offense conviction was unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution. The Court found the registration requirement grossly disproportionate, ineffective for rehabilitation, and harsher than penalties imposed for similar offenses elsewhere. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court to remove the registration requirement from the defendant’s sentence.
Categories: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In Re Fowler Estate
July 20, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Kimberly Thomas
A woman serving as her mother’s patient advocate removed her mother from an assisted living facility, subsequently killed her mother, and then died by suicide. The mother’s estate, represented by one of her other daughters, brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the daughter’s estate and obtained a judgment. When the daughter’s estate proved insolvent, attention turned to a revocable trust the daughter had created, which was the designated beneficiary of her 401(k) account and life…A woman serving as her mother’s patient advocate removed her mother from an assisted living facility, subsequently killed her mother, and then died by suicide. The mother’s estate, represented by one of her other daughters, brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the daughter’s estate and obtained a judgment. When the daughter’s estate proved insolvent, attention turned to a revocable trust the daughter had created, which was the designated beneficiary of her 401(k) account and life insurance policy. The trustee of the daughter’s trust sought a declaratory ruling on whether these proceeds could be used to satisfy the judgment for the mother’s estate.
In the St. Clair Probate Court, the judge determined that the life insurance proceeds were subject to creditor claims under Michigan’s Estates and Protected Individuals Code, but that the 401(k) proceeds were exempt. Both sides appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s decision as to the life insurance but reversed as to the 401(k), holding that neither the statutory exemptions for retirement accounts nor life insurance applied, and thus both sources could be reached by the mother’s estate.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that assets of a revocable trust—such as life insurance and 401(k) proceeds payable to the trust after the settlor’s death—are generally subject to creditor claims if the trust was revocable at the settlor’s death, unless a statutory exception applies. However, the Court found that 401(k) proceeds are exempt from creditor claims under MCL 700.7605(2), and that life insurance proceeds are exempt under MCL 700.7605(4) because, if not paid to the settlor’s estate, they are protected by Michigan’s Insurance Code. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, holding the proceeds were exempt from creditor claims.
Category: Trusts & Estates
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Bowerman v. Red Oak Management Co. Inc.
July 20, 2026 · Michigan Supreme Court · Opinion by Noah Hood
A resident of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled individuals was injured when she stepped into an uncovered and unmarked trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot before sunrise. The apartment complex was managed by a company that had contracted with one entity to replace concrete (which created the trench) and another company to fill the trench, which was not completed until after the resident’s injury. The resident alleged that the management…A resident of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled individuals was injured when she stepped into an uncovered and unmarked trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot before sunrise. The apartment complex was managed by a company that had contracted with one entity to replace concrete (which created the trench) and another company to fill the trench, which was not completed until after the resident’s injury. The resident alleged that the management company breached its statutory duty under Michigan law to keep common areas fit for their intended use, and that the contractor who created the trench was negligent for failing to correct or adequately warn of the hazard. The contractor responsible for filling the trench was dismissed from the case and not part of the appeal.
The Montcalm Circuit Court granted summary disposition to both the property management company and the concrete contractor. The court found that the trash-disposal area remained reasonably accessible and thus fit for its intended use, so the statutory covenant was not breached. The court further ruled that the resident’s claim against the contractor sounded in premises liability, and the contractor owed no duty because the hazard was open and obvious. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither defendant was liable: the trench posed only a “mere inconvenience,” and the contractor had not breached any duty under ordinary negligence principles.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, reviewing the case, held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the contractor breached its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others, and whether the management company violated its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep common areas fit for their intended use. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. The holding clarified that summary disposition was not appropriate because reasonable persons could differ on whether the uncovered, unmarked trench rendered the area unfit for elderly and disabled tenants and created an unreasonable risk of harm.
Categories: Landlord - Tenant, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law
Case summaries courtesy of Justia.